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Tell me something that sounds familiar and I will believe it to be true. This is a statement that we
should believe because it summarizes a well-documented and empirically supported effect: the illusion
of truth effect (see Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010 for a review). The fact is we are more
likely to believe in a statement if we have been previously exposed to it (e.g., Bacon, 1979; Hasher,
Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977). Repetition increases truth-value, generating the illusion that repeated
statements are more valid than information we never heard or read before.
A general assumption of the explanations of the truth effect is that the subjective experience of
processing a familiar statement is interpreted as informing about the validity of the statement (see
Dechêne et al., 2010). This implies that a process of misattribution underlies repetition’s effect on
judgments of truth (e.g., Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1994; Mandler, Nakamura, & Van Zandt, 1987;
Schwarz & Clore, 1983).
In this paper we present an experiment that tests such misattribution process by making more or less
explicit the real source of the feeling of familiarity with the statements. In this way we test whether
illusions of truth decrease when it is clear (vs. unclear) that familiarity is due to previous exposure.
Key words: Illusions of truth, Repetition, Memory, Misattribution.
Truth effect
The first evidence of a truth effect associated with previous exposure was provided by Hasher
et al. (1977). The authors presented students with a set of true and false statements of which they
had no knowledge about. Part of the statements was repeated and part was new. The results showed
evidence of an increase in perceived validity of repeated statements. Since then, several papers
have replicated the effect, and a recent meta-analysis defined it as a well-replicated, medium-sized
effect (Dechêne et al., 2010).
The relation between repetition and truth judgments suggests this effect to be related with
memory features. For example Bacon (1979) and Begg and Armour (1991) showed that not only
repeated statements were judged truer than new ones but also statements judged to be repeated
were rated as more probably true than statements judged to be new. This association between
recognition and truth was independent of the statements’ real repetition status. The relation of
memory with truth seems to be based especially on feelings of familiarity generated by previous
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exposure and not necessarily on a conscious recollection or specific semantic knowledge about
the statements. Assuming that the two components, familiarity and recollection, contribute to
recognition judgments, Begg, Anas and Farinaci (1992) used Jacoby’s Process Dissociation
Procedure (PDP; Jacoby, 1991) and showed that manipulations that undermine the controlled
recollection process (e.g., divided attention) were associated with increased illusions of truth,
while processing conditions associated with optimal recollection reduced the effect.
The results described above were interpreted as evidence of a “non-referential” component of
the truth effect (e.g., Unkelbach & Stahl, 2009) that arises from the subjective experience of ease
associated with repeated stimuli, and which is also integrated in dual processes models of memory
regarding the way we recognize stimulus (e.g., Kelley & Jacoby, 1998, 2000). The hypothesis that
truth judgments may anchor in the experience of processing fluency was tested by Reber and
Schwarz (1999), who manipulated perceptual fluency (figure-ground contrast) of written
statements and asked participants to rate the truth of each one. Results showed that statements
with high contrast were rated truer than statements with low contrast, supposedly because they
were easier to process.
But why do we rely on that subjective experience to make our judgments of truth? There are
two possible answers to this question. One is that the subjective experience reflects memory and
therefore our knowledge about the world, offering a heuristic pathway about the validity of a
statement (e.g., Arkes, Boehm, & Xu, 1991). This view finds support, for example, in Bacon’s
(1979) findings showing a high relationship between memory and truth judgments, i.e., when
participants recognized a statement as being repeated from previous sessions its truth-value
increased. A second possibility is that during our lifetime, and in many contexts, we learn to
associate the subjective experience of ease with validity (e.g., Reber & Unkelbach, 2010;
Unkelbach, 2007; Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013). This view anchors for example in the fact
that perceptual fluency association with truth can be experimentally reversed after a learning
procedure reinforcing the fluency-falseness association, and which can be generalized to other
sources of experience such as familiarity (Unkelbach, 2007).
Misattributions and illusions of truth
The misattribution approach to previous exposure effects (e.g., Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1994;
Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; Klinger & Greenwald, 1994) suggests that reencountering a
stimulus promotes a global subjective experience that is misattributed to some features of the
stimulus itself. Specifically, this approach assumes that this subjective experience is relatively
ambiguous and able to be attributed to any salient feature of the stimulus that could be a probable
cause for such experience (e.g., Jacoby, Allan, Collins, & Larwill, 1988; Jacoby et al., 1989b;
Jacoby & Kelley, 1987; Mandler et al., 1987; Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998; Schwarz &
Clore, 1983; Schwarz et al., 1991; Zillman, Katcher, & Milavsky, 1972). Thus the subjective
experience of processing familiar stimuli can be (mis) attributed to features such as duration of
presentation (longer for familiar words, e.g., Witherspoon & Allan, 1985) or level of background
noise accompanying the presentation of a sentence (lower for familiar sentences, e.g., Jacoby et
al., 1988). Evidence of a misattribution process is usually obtained by manipulating individuals’
access to the real source of the processing experience, with misattributions being more likely when
individuals’ have no knowledge about it. Thus memory misattributions, for example, are more
likely to be found when memory is impaired, because participants cannot recollect that they have
encountered a stimulus before. For instance “false fame” attributions (familiarity with names
induces perceived fame of people) were shown to increase for participants in a divided attention
condition, because the controlled recollection process was impaired and they were more likely to
rely on familiarity (making more errors, e.g., Dywan & Jacoby, 1990; Jacoby et al., 1989; Jennings
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& Jacoby, 1993). This is why, for example, Bornstein’s (1989) meta-analysis of mere-exposure
research revealed an inverse relationship between stimulus recognition accuracy and the magnitude
of the effect.
If misattributions underlie illusions of truth, the effect should also be susceptible to such
manipulations. As stated earlier, Begg and collaborators (1992) showed that processing conditions
that facilitated recollection were associated with a reduction of the truth effect, supposedly because
individuals can identify previous exposure as the probable source of the feeling of familiarity.
Arkes and colleagues (Arkes, Hackett, & Boehm, 1989; Arkes, Boehm, & Xu, 1991) found that
the truth effect is stronger when the source of the feeling of familiarity is dissociated from the
experimental context. In addition, older adults seem to be more susceptible to the truth effect
because they have impaired source memory and so cannot recognize the real source of the
subjective experience associated with familiarity (Law, Hawkins, & Craik, 1998; Skurnik, Yoon,
Park, & Schwarz, 2005). But Begg and Armour’s (1991) study provide perhaps the most relevant
finding for arguing about the relevance of being aware of the source of the subjective experience
of familiarity. In their study, while one group of participants only had to rate the statements for
truth, in another condition participants had to decide in each trial whether the statement was Old
or New, and then rate it for truth. When judgments of familiarity preceded judgments of truth the
truth effect was significantly reduced. The authors explained this finding simply as “perhaps the
demand to think about the past source of retrieved facts reduces the confirmatory value of those
facts” (p. 202).
Present experiment
In this experiment we aim to conceptually replicate the results obtained by Begg and Armour
(1991) but in a context where participants have no information about the origin of the statement
(in the original study statements were attributed to either a truthful or a deceiving source). Thus,
in our experiment, two groups of participants performed truth and recognition judgments, with
one group making the two judgments sequentially (i.e., first, all statements were judged for truth
and only then they were judged for familiarity) and the other one simultaneously (i.e., in each
trial, participants judged the truth and familiarity of the statement). In this way we tested whether
the “demand to think about the past source” of the statements prevents feelings of familiarity to
be misattributed to truth.
Method
Participants
Fifty two participants (48 women; age: M=22.15 years, SD=3.19) took part in the experiment
in exchange for a 10€ voucher to use at a store. Participants were randomly assigned to the four
cells of a 2 (Recognition simultaneous to truth vs. Recognition sequential to truth) x 2 (New vs.
Repeated statements) design, with the last factor manipulated within-participants.
Materials
A total of 112 neutral statements (i.e., statements that are not clearly identified as false or true)
from different topics (e.g., geography, science, general knowledge, etc.) were used. The statements,
half true and half false, were gathered from a previous pre-test (see Garcia-Marques, Silva, Reber,
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& Unkelbach, 2015), Forty-eight of the neutral statements were randomly selected to be the
repeated statements (i.e., presented both in the exposure and in the test phase), and other 48 as the
new statements in the truth ratings task (i.e., the test phase). The remaining 16 statements were
used as new items in the recognition task of the “recognition sequential to truth” condition.
Procedure
Participants arrived to the lab in groups of 6 to 9. After signing an informed consent they were
seated in individual workstations (each workstation was separated from the others by a tall, light-
grey placard, assuring that participants could not see each other during the session to minimize
sources of distraction). The experimenter informed participants were going to participate in a
study with different tasks, some related with the reading of sentences in different colors and other
related with the perception and evaluation of images. After this, participants started the computer
program (e-prime; Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) and initiated the experiment.
Exposure phase. For their first task, participants were told they were going to read a list of
statements, half true and half false, that would appear rapidly on the screen. The list of 48
statements were presented in black letters (Arial font, size 28), one by one in the center of the
screen for 3 s, with a 500 ms blank screen between each statement. Order of presentation of the
statements was randomly determined for each participant.
Distraction tasks. In order to remove the statements presented in the exposure phase from
working memory, participants performed two filler tasks. To support the cover story, one of the
tasks involved the evaluation of different images and the other involved the judgment of sentences
in different colors. Thus, participants were first asked to rate the pleasantness (in two 7-point
rating scales anchored in Bad-Good and Do not like it at all – Like it very much) of 35 images of
different things (e.g., objects, food, people). Then, for the next task participants had to decide if a
group of statements were true or false as quickly as possible, receiving veridical feedback about
their answer. A set of 60 easy statements (e.g., “A guitar is a string instrument”), half true
(presented in dark red or blue) and half false (presented in light red or blue) were presented
individually on the screen and participants pressed either the “S” or the “L” key to indicate whether
the statement was “True” or “False”, respectively. These tasks lasted approximately 15 minutes.
Test phase. After finishing the distraction tasks, participants were randomly assigned to the
sequential vs. simultaneous recognition conditions. Those in the recognition after truth judgments
condition (sequential judgments condition) were told they were going to perform the same task
as before but with a new set of statements and without receiving feedback about their answers.
Then the complete target list of 96 ambiguous statements (48 repeated and 48 new) was randomly
presented and participants had to rate each as “true” or “false”. Statements were presented
individually and remained on the screen until participants pressed either the “S” or the “L” key to
indicate whether the statement was “True” or “False”, respectively. The labels “S – True” and “L
– False” were presented with the statements, close to the lower left and lower right corners of the
screen, respectively. After this, another list of 48 statements was presented to participants and they
were instructed to indicate which of those statements had appeared in both the exposure and in
the test phase of the experiment. One third of the statements were taken from the repeated
statements list, another third was taken from the new statements list, and the last 16 statements
were completely new to the session (they had never been presented before). Order of the statements
was randomly determined. As in the previous phases of the experiment, statements were presented
one by one and remained on the screen until an answer was given. Above each statement was the
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question “Did this statement appear twice during the experiment?” and participants were informed
to press the “S” key to answer “Yes”, or the “L” to answer “No”.
Participants in the condition of recognition simultaneous to truth (simultaneous judgments
condition) were informed that they would see a statement presented in the screen that could be
true or false. They should perform two simultaneous tasks. First they should decide if the statement
was true or false and second if it was an old (presented in exposure phase) or new statement (not
presented in exposure phase). Each statement was presented individually and remained on the
screen until the two answers were given (first the words “True” and False” appeared below the
statement associated with the “S” and “L” keys; than the words “Old” and “New” appeared
associated with the same keys).
Depending on each participant a session lasted between 30 and 40 min. Upon completing the
task participants were prompted to contact the experimenter, who thanked, paid, and fully
debriefed them.
Dependent measures
As dependent measures we used the proportions of “True” responses to true statements (i.e.,
hit rate) and to false statements (i.e., false alarms, FA rate) of the test phase. From these, and
following Unkelbach (2007), we derived signal detection theory (STD, see e.g., Macmillan &
Creelman, 2005) estimates of d’ (discrimination ability; higher values of d’ represent better
discrimination between true and false statements) and C (criteria for answering “True”; C=0
represents the ideal, unbiased respondent; negative values indicate a greater tendency to say True,
and positive values indicate a greater tendency to say False). Participants’ response times (RTs, in
milliseconds) were also collected.
Recognition performance was analyzed using proportions of hits (saying “Yes” to statements
that appeared in the exposure and test phase of the experiment) and False alarms (saying “Yes” to
statements that were new statements) and both d’ and C SDT indexes.
Results
Truth decisions
Truth ratings of the test phase were analyzed with an ANOVA with the two recognition
judgment conditions as a between-participants factor and repetition of the statements as repeated
measure.
Mean Hit rates, FA rates, and SDT d’ and C estimates for truth decisions in the two experimental
conditions are provided in Table 1. For the sake of simplicity, only the analysis of SDT estimates
are presented. The analysis of participants’ discrimination ability (d’) supports the ambiguity of
the material regarding truth status. Mean d’ estimates were very low across all conditions (all
d’s<0.50; see Table 1), suggesting that it was highly difficult for participants to distinguish true
from false facts, both for new and repeated statements [F(1,50)=1.13, p=.293] and in both
experimental conditions (interaction: F<1). However, a main effect of experimental condition,
F(1,50)=23.73, p<.001, η2partial=0.34, suggests that the discrimination was better in the
simultaneous condition (M=0.61; CI[0.44, 0.77]) than in the sequential condition (M=0.03; CI[-
0.12, 0.19]).
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Table 1
Mean Hit rates, FA rates, and SDT d’ and C estimates for truth decisions in the two experimental
conditions
Experimental condition
Sequential Simultaneous
Mean 95% CIa Mean 95% CIa
Hits New 0.51 [0.45, 0.57] 0.66 [0.60, 0.72]
Hits Old 0.71 [0.64, 0.77] 0.68 [0.62, 0.75]
FA New 0.54 [0.48, 0.60] 0.54 [0.47, 0.60]
FA Old 0.66 [0.59, 0.73] 0.47 [0.40, 0.55]
d’ New -0.08 [-0.38, 0.20] 0.59 [0.29, 0.86]
d ‘Old 0.15 [-0.01, 0.32] 0.61 [0.44, 0.79]
C New -0.07 [-0.23, 0.07] -0.29 [-0.45, 0.13]
C Old -0.55 [-0.75, -0.36] -0.24 [-0.44, 0.04]
Note a CI: Confidence Interval.
The analysis of participants’ bias to answer “True” shows evidence of the truth effect. Although
all Cs estimates are negative, reflecting liberal criteria across conditions, means were higher for
new statements (M=-0.19; CI[-0.30, -0.07]) than for old statements (M=-0.40; CI[-0.54, -0.25]),
F(1,50)=13.55, p<.001, η2partial=0.21. Relevant to our hypothesis, the effect was moderated by
condition, F(1,50)=21.28, p<.001, η2partial=0.30. As Table 1 shows, the truth effect is reduced in
the condition where judgments of truth and familiarity were made simultaneously. This suggests
that having to provide simultaneously truth and recognition judgments decreased repetition´s
impact on perceived truth.
Recognition decisions
The analyses of the proportions of responses “Old” in the recognition test for old (Hits) and
for new items (FA) showed that the two experimental conditions differences were only marginally
significant. 
Regarding Hit rate, participants in the sequential judgments condition correctly remembered
statements that had been previously presented more (M=0.82; CI[0.75, 0.88]) than in the
simultaneous condition (M=0.74; CI[0.67, 0.78]), t(50)=1.90, p=.060, d=0.54. The two groups
of participants also differed in the FA rate t(50)=1.70, p=.09, d=0.48, given that participants in
the simultaneous condition made more false recognitions (M=0.03; CI[0.01, 0.04]) than
participants in the sequential condition (M=0.01; CI[-0.01, 0.02]).
Because recognition performance was generally good, several participants had 100% of Hits
and 0% of False alarms. In order to compound SDT indexes to these indexes we performed a
widely used correction suggested by Macmillan and Kaplan, (1985). Contrasts of the two
conditions in d’ show a clear better discrimination in the sequential judgment condition (M=7.55;
CI[6.66, 8.45]) than in the simultaneous one (M=4,19; CI[3.26, 5.12]), t(50)=5.24, p<.001, d=1.48.
However, analysis of C indexes show that participants in the sequential judgment condition also
have a greater bias to respond “Old” (M=-2.21; CI[-2.66, -1.71]) than participants in the
simultaneous condition (M=-1,37; CI[-1.83, -0.88], t(50)=2.60, p=.012, d=0.73).
Conditional analysis
In order to understand how the two conditions impact the relation between truth and recognition
decisions we computed the proportions of truth decisions separated by items that individuals
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recognized as “old” and those they considered “new” (independently of the real recognition status
of the items). These two conditional probabilities were entered as a within-participants factor in
an ANOVA, with the experimental condition as a between-participants factor.
Results show a main effect of recognition decision, F(1,50)=6.31, p=.015, η2partial=.11, in the
sense that a statement recognized as “Old” was more likely to be perceived as true (M=0.50;
CI[.45, .54]) than a statement considered “New” (M=0.43; CI[0.38, 0.47]). As Table 2 suggests
this effect is stronger for the sequential than for the simultaneous judgment condition (interaction:
F(1,50)=16.45, p<.001, η2partial=0.25).
Table 2
Mean True responses given that the statement was recognized as “Old” or “New” in the two
experimental conditions
Experimental condition
Sequential Simultaneous
Mean 95% CIa Mean 95% CIa
P(T/old) 0.72 [0.66, 0.77] 0.28 [0.21, 0.33]
P(T/New) 0.54 [0.47, 0.60] 0.31 [0.25, 0.38]
Note bCI: Confidence Interval.
RTs for truth ratings
Reaction times of the relevant items for the study, i.e. old and new) items were compared in
both conditions. Thus mean reaction times of both types of items were analyzed having the
experimental condition as a between-subject factor. A main effect of type of item, F(1,50)=98.18,
p<.001, η2partial=0.69, suggests that new items took more time to be evaluated (M=5016 ms;
CI[4648, 5384]) than old items (M=4128ms; CI[3778, 4477]). A marginal main effect of condition
occurred, F(1,50)=3.43, p=.069, η2partial=0.07, suggesting that when both judgments were
simultaneous, participants took more time to provide an answer (M=4892ms; CI[4392, 5393])
than when made sequentially (M=4251 ms; CI[3770, 4733]).
Discussion
This experiment clearly shows that asking participants to simultaneously report their feelings
of truth and familiarity with a statement disrupts the truth effect. The typical truth effect was only
found when individuals were asked to decide about the truth status of statements and only
afterwards inquired about the repetition status of those same statements. When an item is presented
and the two judgments are asked simultaneously the truth effect is not present. In this condition,
comparatively with the sequential, we also observed that participants: (1) had worse memory
performance; (2) were less biased to answer “Old” ; (3) provided truth judgments independent of
their memory and (4) show a tendency to take more time to make any type of judgment.
This pattern of results seems to suggest that instead of anchoring their truth judgments in their
memory, these participants dissociated it from memory. In doing so, not only are they not using
the subjective experience of familiarity in their judgments of truth, as they are also not using that
experience to help their memory performance, leading to worse performance. The fact that they
are stricter to answer “old” and that they take more time to evaluate these items, show evidence
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that they anchor their recognition judgments more in a control component of memory and less in
the familiarity component.
These results have theoretical and methodological implications. Theoretically, results inform
about the mechanism by which repetition induces perceived validity. The effect suggests that the
subjective experience of familiarity is unlikely to be simultaneously perceived to inform about,
or to be attributed to, different sources. When that is made evident, participants seem to refuse
familiarity as a source of information for any of the two types of judgments and try to find an
alternative basis for their judgments.
The fact that there is an association of recognition and truth judgments in the sequential
condition and not in the simultaneous could be understood as supporting a referential explanation
of the truth effect (e.g., Arkes et al., 1991; Hasher et al., 1977). That is, truth is referential to
knowledge and when “knowledge” is attributed to previous exposure in the experimental setting,
i.e., in the simultaneous condition, that reference is lost. However, in our view this might not be
necessarily so. Our results are also at odds with a non-referential explanation of the truth effect,
if we assume that the ecological validity of fluency association with truth can be undermined by
a need to use that fluency to inform about any other dimension of the stimuli.
However, our data is relevant to offer further support to the hypothesis that judgments of truth
and recognition anchor in simple subjective experiences. The results also make clear that if a
misattribution process is occurring (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1989), it is disrupted by processing
conditions that call attention to it. In our experimental setting, processing fluency could be
correctly attributed to memory and incorrectly to truth. By being “confronted” with a situation in
which an attribution could be made to two dimensions, participants did not choose one in detriment
to another. They did not seem to engage in a process that helped to define which meaning is the
most appropriate for the subjective experience. Instead participants seem to have acted as if they
recognized their lack of information and anchoring their judgments in that clue.
The methodological relevance of our study lies in the fact that it calls attention to different
effects promoted by how the two measures are obtained. Unkelbach (2007) calls attention to this
fact stating that “It might seem problematic to elicit both kinds of judgments in close succession,
because there is the possibility of mutual dependencies (p. 226)”. However in line with other
authors (Bacon, 1979; Brown & Nix, 1996), his research did not show the effects to be disrupted
by a simultaneous methodology. Also in a related field as the mere exposure effects, the
introduction of a simultaneous measurement of liking and recognition did not disrupt the effect,
but it reduced it (see Brooks & Watkins, 1989). These effects contradict ours and Begg and
Armour’s (1991) results suggesting that calling attention to the repetition status of a statement
reduces its truth value. Thus a relevant question is why is simultaneous measurement so
detrimental in our experiment and not in others?
One possibility is that their conditions did not favor individuals to engage in more elaborative
processing and ours did. Differences in processing are signaled by the different reaction times we
may find between our experiments and for example Unkelbach’s (2007, Experiment 3). In his
experiment the mean of the evaluation of old items was 4750msec and new items 4285msec,
whereas ours were evaluated in 4128msec and 5016msec. But why did our condition favor more
controlled processes? One reason for this to occur may be the number of items to be evaluated,
whereas his participants evaluated 120 items, ours evaluated 96 items. Another reason may be the
features of the distraction task of both studies, since Unkelbach’s task caused a break of between
25 and 30 minutes and ours of 15 minutes. The longer duration could have been more disruptive
and prevent individuals to disregard fluency as they seem to do in our experiment. In summary,
the disruption we observed in our experiment has not been obtained in all other experiments.
However, this might suggest that there are conditions more prone to a disruption of effects than
others (see Garcia-Marques, Nunes, Marques, Carneiro, & Weinstein, 2015).
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In conclusion, this paper highlights the fact that the relation of truth with memory can favor or
prevent illusions of truth. Repetition is powerful in leading us to believe that a statement is true,
but also leads us to categorize an item as new or old. Our data suggests that when memory
judgments are primed this will prevent the occurrence of the illusion of truth. To some extent,
these data attest the wonderful capacity of the human being: it develops efficiency by replacing
complex judgments by easy ones (the heuristic approach, e.g., Kahneman, 2003), which can induce
illusions and biases, but also has ways of preventing them.
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“Sim é verdade! Já ouvir em qualquer lado isso!”. E sim é verdade o que diz essa frase e devemos
acreditar nisso porque ela resume um efeito muito bem documentado e com muito suporte empírica
na literatura. Trata-se do efeito da ilusão de verdade (ver Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010
para uma revisão). Este efeito define que é mais provável que acreditemos que uma afirmação é
verdadeira se esta nos for previamente apresentada (e.g., Bacon, 1979; Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino,
1977). O que os estudos têm documentado é que a repetição aumenta o valor de verdade de qualquer
afirmação, promovendo a ilusão de que as afirmações repetidas são mais válidas do que afirmações às
quais não fomos anteriormente expostos.
O pressuposto geral de todas as explicações deste efeito é o de que a experiência subjectiva associada
ao modo como processamos uma afirmação familiar, fluentemente, é interpretada como informativa
da sua validade (see Dechêne et al., 2010). Isto pressupõe que o efeito da repetição nos julgamentos
de verdade tem subjacente um processo de atribuição errónea (misattribution) de um sentimento a uma
causa que não o promoveu (e.g., Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1994; Mandler, Nakamura, & Van Zandt,
1987; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). 
Neste artigo apresentamos um estudo que testa estes processos de atribuição errónea, reduzindo-a por
tornar a fonte do sentimento de familiaridade mais explícita para os participantes. Testamos se as
ilusões de verdade diminuem quando se torna claro (vs. pouco claro) o facto da sensação de
familiaridade é originada pela exposição prévia no contexto do estudo.
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